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Abstract
This article makes a novel contribution to the literature on Bhutan’s
International Relations (IR) by shifting the focus away from an exclusively
India–China framing. First, it points out how small states are increasingly
salient but under-studied in IR and how non-European non-island states
like Bhutan are even more so, and why we gain by addressing this.
Second, it shows how the conventional study of Bhutan has solely fo-
cused on its friendship with India and the threat to it/this from China,
and why it is important that these conventional narratives be critically ex-
amined. In doing so, we perceive the endogenous drivers of Bhutan’s for-
eign policies, for instance via Bhutan’s stance on the Doklam issue. Third,
going beyond the three typical determinants (economic factors, bilateral
relations with India, and threats from China), the article provides two ad-
ditional axes of understanding Bhutan’s foreign policies – bridging of at-
tributional distances and learning from experience.
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1 Introduction
A small non-western developing country like Bhutan does not receive
much attention in International Relations (IR). As a rare landlocked1
country between two rising powers in Asia, it is likely the only strategic
geopolitical location about which the scholarly IR literature is so
sparse. This article makes the case for attending more rigorously to the
trajectory of Bhutan’s international relations as a way of understanding
the geopolitical developments in the Himalayan region and their impli-
cations for the role of small states in regions of significant rivalry
among larger entities (in this case, India and China).
It is understudied for many reasons, especially because focus on it is
generally framed through the interests and perspectives of the more
prominent larger powers like China and India. This is partly the result
of big power geopolitics inherited from an imperial era that sees such
small states in rivalrous terms merely as arenas of contest and influ-
ence. It is also a consequence of the producers of scholarship on
Bhutan who have historically been those working within state institu-
tions in the larger countries (especially India, which became heir to the
role of British India in the region and fostered a close relationship
with Bhutan) and generate strategic work from narrow national interest
perspectives. The lack of focus on a comprehensive and multidimen-
sional understanding of Bhutan’s foreign policy (that does not attribute
its actions to external actors only) was further exacerbated by the
unique circumstances in the country through most of the 20th
century.2
Both historical accounts of the country and strategic analyses of its
behavior have often relied upon repeating a narrow set of sources and
the repetition of tired tropes. Predictably, this results in the perpetua-
tion of Orientalist clichés in some disciplines, but in IR, the crucial
1 Among the subset of landlocked countries over the globe, Bhutan and Nepal lying geo-
graphically between India and China, and Mongolia lying geographically between Russia
and China, are distinctive in being landlocked with only two neighbours, both of whom are
‘rising powers’. The UN has urged viewing landlocked countries anywhere, however, as
‘landlinked’ so that they can be seen as bridges to possible connexions (see UN 2014).
2 Although undergraduate colleges and centres for the study of language, culture, and tradi-
tional medicine had existed since the 1960s, the first university was established in Bhutan in
the 21st century (the Royal University of Bhutan in 2003, and the study of political science
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impact is the way in which the behavior of this small state is seen as
entirely exogenously directed. This results in accounts that only look to
entities like India and China in explaining the regional security equilib-
ria or shocks to it. By contrast, this article will provide a contextual
‘thick description’ (to borrow a well-known term coined by Geertz) of
Bhutan’s behavior and its role in the evolving dynamics of the region.
Work on Bhutan internationally has been along the following lines –
Bhutan’s historic interactions with British India until the start of the
20th century; emphatic assertions of Bhutan’s strong friendship with
post-colonial India from 1947 onwards; Bhutan’s ‘southern problem’3
when its ethnic Nepalese (Lhotsampa) population from southern areas
fled or were expelled during internal turmoil; and more recently, a few
accounts of the democratic transition completed in Bhutan in 2008.
These areas of work (which I cite later in this article) often tend to
proceed along parallel lines with little interconnect, with British and
Indian history scholars traditionally choosing selective years of focus,
amplifying narratives from specific official perspectives, and selectively
drawing upon sources (for details and critique of this, see Kaul,
2021b). In the manner of pre-PRC controlled Tibet, Bhutan has some-
times been projected as a Shangri La by western travellers; it has also
been perceived in exotic terms by Indians.
In contemporary work too, Bhutan has been geopolitically con-
structed as ‘asymmetrically inbetween’ India and China (Kaul, 2021a)
so that it does not have formal diplomatic relations with its northern
neighbor China, while its contemporary southern regions – its historic
fertile southern regions were resettled with various Nepalese popula-
tions for cultivation and some parts were annexed to India in the 19th
century – have been bequeathed a complexity in ethnic and civic terms.
The work on the ‘southern problem’ that peaked in the late 1980s and
3 This was triggered in the late 1980s and early 1990s by a mix of ethnic strife, state securiti-
zation, and sovereignty preservation impulses. The Royal Government of Bhutan perspec-
tive is quite clearly outlined in MHA (1993). Banki (2013, 125) writes: ‘The circumstances
that generated the exile of tens of thousands of Bhutan’s southern-residing, mostly Hindu-
practising, ethnically Nepali population have been covered in detail elsewhere... In sum, a
suite of social, political and ethno-cultural pressures force the Nepali Bhutanese – also
called ‘Lhotshampa’ – to depart Bhutan between 1989 to 1992’. For further elaboration,
see Hutt (2003, 2013); Iyer (2019). For details complicating the narrative, see Rattan
(1989); Bray (1993); Ahsan and Chakma (1993); Sharma (1994, 34–35); Mathou (1999,
613–614); Mehta (2002, 95). See also Kaul (2008b).
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early 1990s has also included the later studies by human rights activists
and scholars on the Lhotsampa refugee camps in Nepal and the subse-
quent resettlement of Bhutanese refugees to several Western countries.
These latter scholars are based in various places, especially institutions
in Nepal and in the countries where the refugees were resettled. Some
are also part of exiled Bhutanese political networks and their views on
Bhutanese monarchy and democracy are condemnatory.4 This is in
stark contrast to the legitimacy and reverence of monarchy in Bhutan,
not just for its titular, but also for its role in welfarist terms (for in-
stance, the Kings are a direct source of welfare ‘kidus’ in Bhutan to
help the general population at any time of distress) and from a
sovereignty-preservation perspective.5
The above is evidently a very zoomed-out overview but it is vital to
set out the broader terrain of work about a country whose internal or
external politics many scholars (even in the Asian region) may not be
familiar with. Studies on the political dynamics within contemporary
Bhutan are rare, and Bhutan is still seen through the polarizing per-
spectives of the ‘Shangri La’ and ‘Southern Problem’. In contradistinc-
tion to this, the present article is cognizant of Bhutan’s contemporary
dynamics and political transformations in the 21st century; it further
argues for greater attention to this country’s endogenous drivers of for-
eign policy and IR on its own terms – moving beyond the exclusively
India/China national interest framing, and also moving beyond the po-
larizing Shangri-La/Southern Problem framing that views the country’s
dynamics, rather emotively, as either perfect or wretched.
Bhutan has undergone tremendous political changes in the 21st cen-
tury that deserve reference, ranging from renegotiating its treaty with
India to remove a clause that potentially restricted its foreign relations;
to an elite-led transition to democracy that was widely seen as undesir-
able within the country; to three general elections (in 2008, 2013, and
2018) bringing three different political parties to power; to internal
contestations around the potential influence of India or China in
Bhutan’s own internal political sphere; to gradual design and evolution
4 See Rizal (2004)
5 Bhutan’s survival as a sovereign nation was far from certain through much of the 20th
century when bordering Tibet was annexed to China and neighbouring kingdom of Sikkim
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of democratic mechanisms that clarify division of powers, growing
awareness and practice of freedom of speech, demand for public ac-
countability of officials even in high profile cases involving ministers or
the judiciary, to defining nationality in more internally inclusivist
terms, to enacting progressive legislation such as the recent decriminal-
ization of homosexuality. While Bhutan continues to be restricted in its
maneuverability vis a vis China on full and formal diplomatic relations
or to settle a border dispute in an area that India considers as strategic,
and is economically closely intertwined with India through trade, it is
nonetheless on a carefully calibrated pathway to democratic consolida-
tion and incremental internationalization.
It is also factually correct that Bhutan has gradually expanded its
degrees of freedom and steadily risen in regional rankings on a range
of economic, social, and political indicators, both in absolute terms
and relative to other South Asian countries. While no rankings can
ever provide a complete picture, this landscape indicates the overall tra-
jectory. Currently, Bhutan is the only South Asian country in the top
20 in the Global Peace Index, at 19 (India is at 139, Nepal at 73, China
at 104, Bangladesh at 97, Sri Lanka at 77, Pakistan at 152); it stands
at 65 in the Press Freedom Index (India is at 142, Nepal at 106, China
at 177, Bangladesh at 152, Sri Lanka at 127, Pakistan at 145); it ranks
at 24 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (India is at 86, Nepal at 33,
China at 78, Bangladesh at 26, Sri Lanka at 94, Pakistan at 124); it
ranks at 129 in the Human Development Index (India is at 131, Nepal
at 142, China at 85, Bangladesh at 133, Sri Lanka at 72, Pakistan at
154). In the Freedom House rankings for democracy, all these South
Asian countries rank as ‘Partly Free’ (except China that is ‘Not Free’
at 9, and Indian- and Pakistani- administered parts of Kashmir ‘Not
Free’ at 27 and 28 respectively). Here, Bhutan ranks at 61 (compared
with India at 67, Nepal at 56, Bangladesh at 39, Sri Lanka at 56).
Against this background, this article makes an innovative contribu-
tion in pulling together several threads of work that have constrained
cross-cutting scholarship on Bhutan and enmeshes this within broader
contemporary IR frameworks. It proceeds from the empirical observa-
tion that Bhutan has been understudied in IR, and while this is not
unpredictable given conventional IR focus, it must be attended to.
Also, Bhutan has been seen in specific ways and through certain tropes,
which are not exhaustive, nor should they be restrictive in ways
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that force all future scholarship to not move beyond these goalposts.
This article provides an understanding of Bhutan’s IR, highlighting the
perspectives and motivations that are endogenous in order to allow a
complexity that is often missed in the political literature that is tied to
strategic interests of specific larger states or emanates from a single-
issue prism. The finding of rational pursuit of survival for a small state
may not be in itself groundbreaking, but detailing the specific contours
of this finding and how this survival was made operable in the case of
Bhutan is an important contribution to this literature. Quite vitally,
this article pioneers work that refuses to take for granted starting from
the Indian–Chinese perspectives as the only valid framework for the
study of Bhutan.
The three main moves in the structure are as follows. First, I point
out how small states are increasingly salient but under-studied in IR
and how non-European non-island states like Bhutan are even more
so, and why we gain by addressing this. Second, I shows how the con-
ventional study of Bhutan has solely focused on its friendship with
India and the threat to it/this from China, and why it is important that
these conventional narratives be critically examined. In doing so, I
show how the endogenous drivers of Bhutan’s foreign policies have not
received the attention they deserve, and specifically, Bhutan’s stance on
the Doklam issue illustrates the importance of how we can perceive
this. Third, I suggest two additional axes of explaining Bhutan’s for-
eign policies: multidimensional idea of distance and learning from ex-
perience. I show empirically how Bhutan’s internationalization over
time can be understood through a process of bridging various kinds of
attributional distances (as opposed to the purely geographical focus in
standard framing), and how Bhutan’s learning from the experience of
other countries is salient.
2 Small states, IR, and Bhutan
Across disciplines, a body of work has addressed questions pertaining
to small states, for instance, the nature of smallness and debates over
classification, methodologies for categorization, economic problems,
processes of overcoming vulnerabilities, selection of multilateral strate-







/irap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/irap/lcab010/6327065 by guest on 24 July 2021
Sutton, 1999; Crowards, 2002; Cooper and Shaw, 2009; Lee, 2016).
Bhutan is not part of any of these studies.
IR has come a long way from early doubts about the analytical use-
fulness of the concept of small states (Baehr, 1975; Amstrup, 1976).
Veenendaal and Corbett (2014) provide a methodological rationale for
why small states matter and counter the typical reasons that are often
offered for not attending to them.6 Small states empirically exist, they
are ‘not just large states writ small’ (Jesse and Dreyer, 2016, xiii).
Likewise, Baldacchino (2018) is an unapologetically powerful defense
of undertaking the study and analysis of small states and territories be-
yond exceptionalism and exoticism, as significant in itself and on its
own merits.
In modern times, not only has the number of small states increased,
but it has become increasingly evident that as sovereign actors, their
disadvantages in terms of absolute power are able to be offset by the
advantages available to them through the ability internally to manage
domestic politics and bureaucracy in a more directed manner, and ex-
ternally to pursue influence in, and through, multilateral organizations
by projecting themselves as norm entrepreneurs in specific issue areas.
Corbett, Xu and Weller (2019, 656–657) suggest that this norm entre-
preneurship is linked to the competent performance of vulnerability by
small states through rhetorical action, collaboration, and active partici-
pation in international organizations.7 Ó Súilleabháin (2014) discusses
the role of small states at the UN, noting that small states often excel
in multilateral diplomacy and prioritize international rule of law. Their
diplomacy is agile, priority-based, develops niche areas (for instance on
mitigating arms trade or climate change), emphasizes regional ties, and
is broadly cooperative on the basis of substantive or thematic alliances.
Thorhallsson and Bailes (2016, 301) identify the ways in which small
state diplomacy in international negotiations can be accentuated. The
scale of threats and the vulnerabilities of small states might be great,
but equally, with the complex threats, for instance such as those caused
by the coronavirus pandemic (which are not just biological or public
6 The reasons usually given for not taking small state dynamics seriously are as follows: their
insignificant population size; them not being ‘real’ states; being excluded by others; the ab-
sence of data; the perceived need to compare similar systems.
7 For an overview tabulation of various small state groupings in international organisations,
see Corbett, Xu and Weller (2019, 649–650).
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health-related in any simplistic way, but also deeply political and politi-
cizing), several small states have performed surprisingly well precisely
because of their coherent responses. The nature of the traditional and
non-traditional security environments in the 21st century does not
straightforwardly indicate an equation of small with weak.
How small states make foreign policy decisions and the variety of
diplomatic means that they employ is a question that does not lend it-
self to an easy generalization. They deserve the empirical depth of spe-
cific country case studies just as much as the more widely prevalent nu-
merical or statistical analyses that group small countries together
usually by way of continents, even when this may not always yield the
most valuable insights. It is the conceptual axes of geopolitical location
vis a vis land and/or sea, the relevant colonial or other larger power be-
ing in proximity or distant, and the nature of conflicts over economic
resources or transboundary ideological overlaps, that are arguably
much more germane in understanding the types of interlinked foreign-
policy objectives and diplomatic strategies that are more likely to be
adopted by a particular small state (and replicated by perhaps another
on a different continent).
Traditional IR expects small states to align with larger neighbors or
powers, typically in offensive or defensive alliances, for balancing and/
or with bandwagoning.8 But, equally, to quote Keohane (1969, 300,
italics original), ‘the imprecision of international relations terminology
is nowhere more obvious or painful than in discussions of alliances’.
Critiquing the traditional alliance theory for its insufficiently developed
conceptualizations of small-scale behavior, Bailes, Thayer and
Thorhallsson (2016) put forward an approach of ‘alliance shelter’ to re-
flect the complex motivations and conduct of small states (moving be-
yond the usual emphasis on the experience of European small states,
they use the examples of Armenia, Cuba, and Singapore).
International IR literature on the study of small states has hardly
ever included any work on Bhutan.9 What work exists in Asian IR/area
studies has focused on three neorealist structural axes: economic
8 Not specific to small states, Jackson (2014) argues that hedging, as opposed to not balanc-
ing or bandwagoning, is the rational/central tendency in Asian international relations, not
due to power transition uncertainty between US and China, or mistrust under a multipolar
system, but due to the complexity of a regional network marked by sensitivity, fluidity, and
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conditions, bilateral relationship with India, and threats from or
engagements with China. Even specific studies of small states’ foreign
policy behavior (such as Hey, 2003) do not contain analyses on
Bhutan. Moreover, among those who challenge the neo/realist views
about the generalizability of theories on small state behavior, the diver-
sification of strategies used by small states is seen in binomial terms, so
that affluent Western small states are understood as norm creators,
while small and impoverished non-Western states are understood to be
focused on regime survival-type concerns.
The case of Bhutan adds complexity to this typology, with it being
an impoverished small state that is low on resources but high on nor-
mative power through norm advocacy and by setting an example. Note
that Bhutan has not only actively advocated for Gross National
Happiness or GNH as a criterion of development,10 it constitutionally
mandates that 60% of its territory remain under forest cover in perpe-
tuity (this provides an international positive externality in a fragile
high-altitude Himalayan ecosystem), it is a rare carbon-negative coun-
try, and a functioning Asian welfare state. Owing to the success of its
developmental and social indicators, it will also have the distinction of
graduating, by 2023, up from being a least developed country (LDC)
to a lower middle-income country, even though it would not have met
the economic vulnerability criteria (Dorji, 2018).11 In 2020–21, Bhutan
managed to combat the coronavirus pandemic with only one life lost,
in a strikingly different manner to the tragedies that unfolded in the
states surrounding it, in Asia and beyond (see Kaul, 2021c).
9 Misra (2004) is one article on small states’ foreign policy that mentions Bhutan in its title
(along with Maldives and Nepal; Bhutan is referred to least number of times). The article
even problematically compares it to North Korea, and draws on Weber to ask whether
these places are ‘backward and failed states’. Other (non-IR related) work looks at tour-
ism policy or sustainable development.
10 Theys and Rieteg (2020) illustrate the ability of small states to influence global governance
by using the case of Bhutan’s successful challenge to the fundamental ideas about what
constitutes development through its placing of happiness on the global agenda.
11 The Kuensel newspaper report (Dorji 2018) explains that the assessment as low-income
countries is based on three criteria – gross national income (GNI) per capita, human
assets index (HAI) and economic vulnerability index (EVI). ‘A country becomes eligible
for graduation if it meets the threshold levels for graduation for at least two of the three
criteria during two triennial reviews . . . While Bhutan easily meets two of the three crite-
ria, economic vulnerability index remains a challenge’.
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A large corpus of texts on the country’s international relations are
about its bilateral relationship or ‘friendship’ ties with India. These
tend to be written by Indian scholars and journalists from the perspec-
tive of India’s foreign policy priorities, and thus focus on Indian secu-
rity vulnerabilities, long-standing extension of friendship by India to
Bhutan, and Indian fear of Bhutan–China relations.12 They emphasize
Bhutan’s friendship and loyalty to India: ‘While Nepal tried to play
China against India and vice-versa, Bhutan remained steadfastly with
India’ (Joseph, 2012, 2), but rarely include critical analysis of Indian
representations of Bhutan. The reactions to Bhutan–China engage-
ments (including talks over the border since 1984) can range the gamut
from ‘this is the time to put a firm foot over the kingdom’ (Avtar,
1986, 199) to ‘India should be watchful’ (Bisht, 2010, 353). It is un-
usual to find mention of Bhutanese concerns in discussions of Sino-
Bhutan border talks, but there are occasional acknowledgements:
‘For Bhutan, the border problem is its biggest security challenge and is
critical to its future as a nation-state. Hence, Bhutan regards border so-
lution as an end in itself, and wants a speedy settlement’ (Kumar,
2010, 248).
Even in recent work in specifically relevant areas, Bhutan is men-
tioned peripherally. For instance, Bhatnagar and Ahmed (2020, 4) in
discussing the geopolitics of landlocked states in South Asia,13 explain
it away in a sparing reference or two:
While it has retained its territorial independence, it remains firmly
under India’s sphere of influence (Ethirajan, 2018). Guided by the
Bhutan-India Treaty of 1949, it is the largest recipient of Indian aid,
although there is an attempt to reduce its dependence on India
(D’Ambrogio, 2019). While Sikkim and Bhutan succumbed to
Indian influence, Nepal has continued to resist.
12 This denial of any Bhutan–China connexion goes back in time. See Dutt (1981) for an
unravelling of some of these complexities. In general, a fairly large number of publications
about the country’s foreign relations, typically by outisder scholars, are derivative and/or
rather tediously focused on establishing how it has an ancient Hindu/Indian history or are
exclusively concerned with the threat posed to it by China. For instance, Kharat (2004, 11)
prefaces the discussion on ‘Background and basic determinants of Bhutan’s foreign pol-
icy’ by referring to Indological assertions that Bhutan was originally a Hindu kingdom.
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The treaty of 1949 mentioned here was updated in 2007 and yet
Bhutan has often been depicted as a protectorate of India, due to
a mix of Indian territorial enthusiasm and wider global ignorance.
The sources listed for the country in the academic article extract pre-
sented above are not scholarly, but media reports about the ‘shangri la
caught between the super powers’.
The conventional and mainstream narrative goes thus – Bhutan was
in self-imposed isolation until 1960s, when under the threat of Chinese
aggression, it aligned with India. This confirmed predictions made by
the IR theories of small state behavior. India–Bhutan friendship is the
sole axis of Bhutanese foreign policy, and this was cemented through
the visit of Indian PM Nehru to Bhutan in 1958. Bhutan has since
then loyally sided with India and has had to fend off constant threat
of Chinese aggression and territorial encroachment. In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, Bhutan enacted a ‘one nation, one people’ policy and
expelled some of its ethnically Nepalese population from its southern
regions. India has helped Bhutan develop, initiated it to join the UN,
and kindly agreed to update the 1949 treaty in 2007, allowing Bhutan
a free rein in its foreign policy, which Bhutan did not really need, as
all its interests have always been served by India as an ally. The first
elected government in Bhutan, after its transition to democracy in
2007–08, made overtures toward China, however, it was voted out of
power at the next elections. Indian and Bhutanese interests are one and
the same, Indian largesse allows Bhutan to flourish, and Bhutan must
repay these favors by demonstrating its continued loyalty to India, a
key component of which is to keep China at bay. The vocabulary of
friendship has indeed been pivotal in Bhutan–India relations but the
uses of friendship discourse between nations here deserves a closer
scrutiny. In the next section, I re-constellate a genealogy to illustrate
how this narrative is selective in terms of what it spotlights and omits.
3 Bhutan’s international relations: friendship and
beyond
Why examine the uses of the vocabulary of ‘friendship’ between
nations? Pannier (2019) points to the significance of bilateral relations
which can range from enmity to friendship and from limited diplo-
matic contact to specialness; they have been at the core of diplomacy
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in historical, strategic, and also numerical terms. Hutchison and
Bleiker’s (2014) survey of the literature that links emotions and inter-
national relations finds that major political phenomena ranging from
war to fear are veined with emotions. ‘Emotions are thus an intrinsic
part of how politics is conducted, perceived, and evaluated’ (ibid: 496).
As scholars like Doty (1997) have argued, the role of representations is
important to understand in order to grasp the productive (via cogni-
tion, action, and policy-generation) ways in which they function.
Affect clearly plays a role in all relations, including those between
states. The vocabulary of friendship captures this role of affect in poli-
tics (see Oelsner and Koschut, 2014, 17). Talking of friendship between
states makes it possible for the study of international relations in more
horizontal, relational, and reciprocal terms (see Devere and Smith,
2010; Nordin and Smith, 2018). International Friendship may be de-
fined as ‘a bilateral relationship developing within the multimember se-
curity community – it is akin to a “special relationship”’ (Oelsner and
Koschut, 2014, 15). The conditions that will obtain such a category of
relationship are – symbolic interaction, affective attachment, self-
disclosure, mutual commitment (ibid: 20–21). It is likely that for a rela-
tionship to be identified as such there would be social bonds, institu-
tionalized cooperation, trust building through partnerships, shared
symbols and practices, consultation mechanisms, integrated regional-
ism, solidarity and reciprocal commitment, and so on. Devere, Mark
and Verbitsky (2011) analyze the language of friendship in interna-
tional treaties (Bhutan’s Treaty with India is not considered)14 indicat-
ing that it can be modelled as a diplomatic method of goodwill and
peace-building, and also, as a manipulative, utilitarian, and superficial
use of the signifier ‘friendship’ as a tool for economic and commercial
interests of larger powers.
14 The 1949 Indo-Bhutan Treaty, signed shortly after Indian independence, refers to the
‘friendship’ aspect of the bilateral relationship most prominently by historical comparison
with previous versions of Bhutan’s treaties with Britain. The clauses within it mark the
friendship as existing and continuing; it is widely referred to as the ‘Indo-Bhutan Treaty of
Friendship’. This 1949 treaty was based upon the 1910 treaty of Punakha between Bhutan
and Britain, which is the focus of my forthcoming work. Throughout the second part of
the 20th century, until being updated in 2007, the Friendship Treaty retained the clause
about Bhutan seeking India’s guidance in external relations, From the 1960s onwards, the
economic collaboration – beginning first with a five year plans in 1961, and then with the
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The friendship between Bhutan and India is generally projected
back in time to the theme of shared cultural connexion via
Buddhism,15 and then following on from the 1949 Friendship Treaty
with India, the visit of Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru to
Bhutan is seen as a defining moment. His meeting with the moderniz-
ing third King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck is a deeply ingrained trope of
rehearsing the history of the friendship.16 Nehru’s 1958 visit to Bhutan
was indeed meant to be a diplomatically engineered spectacle worthy
of the legacy it created (see Mehta, 2002). The image of Nehru travel-
ling on the back of the yak for days to reach remote Bhutan was the
result of a well thought out diplomatic endeavor on the part of the
Indian Political Officer (formerly, an important official post in the
Himalayan region) who had a key role in choreographing the visit.
The studies of friendships in international relations tend to focus ei-
ther exclusively on Western state actors or situations where at least one
entity in an important bilateral relationship is Western; in contradis-
tinction to this, Bhutan provides a good case where from the second
half of the 20th century onwards, this relationship inherited an imperial
legacy that had to be negotiated and navigated by two non-Western
states that were marked by a power asymmetry that is significant for
postcolonial securitization. What the friendship foregrounds for the
two countries can be apparent in choice of emphases.
Referring to India’s fear that Bhutan’s northern relations (with
China) would jeopardize the territory connecting mainland to north
east India, the so-called ‘chicken’s neck’, a Bhutanese scholar writes,
‘Nehru visited Bhutan on a horseback in September 1958 to convince
Bhutan end its isolation policy and accept India’s economic assistance’
(Penjore, 2004, 121–122). Another Bhutanese author, Wangdi (2014),
perceives the friendship as encompassing not just Nehru and the eco-
nomic ties, but the sacrifice of Indian teachers and construction
15 Notwithstanding the official insistence upon shared cultures, and based upon my long-
standing experience in both these countries, I concur with Rose (1974, 208) that there are
basic differences between the culture and value systems of the two countries (Bhutan and
India). The enduring ties have been not, because of, but in spite of, these differences.
16 Despite the wilful and multifaceted depreciation of Nehru and his legacy after the post-
2014 Modi-led BJP government assumed power in India, the official Indian image of
Nehru in Bhutan continues to be unassailable.
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laborers in Bhutan (to build the education system and the roads; most
migrant workers in Bhutan are from India), the centrality of Buddhist
ethos in Bhutan,17 and the significance of Indian intellectuals such as
Ambedkar (noted constitutionalist and luminary of the Dalit move-
ment) in having avowed Buddhism. An Indian commentator, by con-
trast, notes, ‘After the arduous journey he [Nehru] gifted Bhutan its
first road’ (Rattan, 1989, 134, emphasis mine).
A solely external focus misses crucial aspects of the motives and
implications of Bhutan’s behavior, in terms of institutional setup, do-
mestic factors, and the role of elites (factors salient in analyses such as
Elman 1995, 173–175 and Gvalia et al. 2013). The domestic situation
is linked to the international scenario in ways that are not adequately
captured by the state-centric theories relying upon the unitary under-
standing of national interest. Recovering oft-neglected monitors of the
region such as Rose (1974), we can discern that the indigenous drivers
of Bhutanese policy were evident even between 1949 and 1970s. For in-
stance, following Nehru’s visit, Bhutan’s immediate response was ‘non-
committal’, and even as the situation in Lhasa rapidly deteriorated in
1959, the government ‘was initially vacillating’ (195). Although Bhutan
eventually decided to accept Indian aid, in 1960, it imposed a total ban
on trade with Tibet in its north even at the cost of the blow to its own
economy. This was a unilateral Bhutanese decision. As Rose writes,
‘Indeed, Bhutan occasionally moved slightly ahead of India on certain
aspects of its China policy’ (ibid., 196).
The guidance in external relations clause in the 1949 treaty was
interpreted by India as meaning that ‘Bhutan could not have direct
relations with a third power except with India’s concurrence’, while
Bhutan contended that ‘it must consult with New Delhi on external
relations but need not accept the advice received’ (197). The 1960s in
Bhutan was a decade marked by conspiracy, assassinations, and recali-
brations.18 However, even so, the Bhutanese ‘were determined to
17 The historical centrality of Buddhist ethos to Bhutanese politics is explained by Long
(2021).
18 There are varying explanations for the assassination of the Bhutanese PM Jigme Dorji,
the abortive assassination attempt on the third King in July 1965, and the fleeing to Nepal
of the younger brother of the Prime Minister who was appointed in his place (Lhendup
Dorji), having alleged Indian involvement in assassination and conspiracy. The third King
visited India in May 1966 to reassure New Delhi; in the same year, the political officer was
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prevent India’s economic aid programs from becoming instruments for
India’s intervention in Bhutanese decision-making’ (201). During the
1960s, when India attempted to pressure Bhutan by suspending aid for
a month amid rumors of increasing Chinese influence in Bhutan, the
Bhutanese assembly passed a unanimous motion declaring that ‘it was
better to have no aid at all than aid which was interrupted in this way’
(Mitra and Thaliyakkattil, 2018, 246). This awareness of aid as an in-
strument of manipulation has been a continued factor in Bhutan’s very
cautious acceptance of aid from other powers over time, and in its reg-
ulation of foreign investment, including from the Indian commercial
sector.
Many endogenous drivers of Bhutanese policy are often forgotten.
The National Assembly (a 20th-century precursor to the later fully
democratic institution with the same name) took up strong nationalist
positions19 and voted for Bhutan’s participation in the United
Nations,20 which eventually came about in 1971 after detailed
Bhutanese negotiations to achieve Indian support. Similarly, Bhutan’s
international recognition of Bangladesh (Bhutan being the first country
in the world to do so) was undertaken at its own initiative (Rose, 1974,
204); apart from a diplomatic success, it was also a sound practical
move toward a newly sovereign nearer small state with alternative mar-
ket access and transit potential. When we look at the drive in Bhutan
toward identity-consolidation from late 1970s onwards, for instance,
the ‘Bhutanisation’ of government offices (encouraging replacement of
foreign with indigenous expertise), the enforcement of a uniform cul-
tural code called the Driglam Namzha, the enactment of new citizen-
ship laws, or the unconventional democratization at the behest of the
fourth King (Jigme Singye Wangchuck), the interlinkages of domestic
and international factors are salient (cf. Putnam, 1988). In order to un-
derstand the perceptions at play, it is important to note that in 1989,
(1974, passim). The Indian advisor (Nari Rustomji), appointed in 1963, also wrote a paral-
lel account of events.
19 Since 2008, Bhutan has a monarchy combined with Westminster variant of parliamentary
democracy. The co-existence of monarchy with parliamentary democracy in Bhutan, and
the increase in support for both these institutions concurrently, challenges Huntington’s
‘King’s Dilemma’ (on this latter point, see Corbett, Veenendaal and Ugyel 2017).
20 The indigenous Bhutanese initiative in this at least is acknowledged by authors who would
otherwise take no cognisance of it in Bhutan’s foreign policy. For instance, see Menon and
Kanisetti (2018).
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the fourth King of Bhutan explained to an Indian journalist ‘None of
our decisions is anti-India..All that we are doing is to see and ensure
that Bhutan remains Bhutan’ (Rattan, 1989, 137).
Ahsan and Chakma (1993, 1046) describe Bhutan’s assertion of au-
tonomy in relations with India in late 1970s: in 1978, the diplomatic
mission in New Delhi was renamed the Royal Bhutan Embassy;
Bhutan did not agree with India’s position at the Nonaligned
Movement (NAM) conference in Havana on the issue of admission of
People’s Republic of Kampuchea to the UN, and on the issue of the
rights of landlocked countries at the Manila Meeting of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V); and while usu-
ally abstaining from UN votes on the Afghanistan issue, Bhutan also
voted with the South Asian states other than India against the presence
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. At a press conference in Bombay in
September 1979, the fourth King (Jigme Singye Wangchuck) stated
that the Indo-Bhutanese treaty of 1949 needed to be updated in the in-
terest of both countries so that nothing was left to ‘open interpreta-
tion’ (in ibid.). In 1959, Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji ‘hinted
that Bhutan was not bound to accept all of India’s advice in its con-
duct of foreign relations . . . he was also quite confident that China
would not attack Bhutan’ (Mitra and Thaliyakkattil, 2018, 245–246).
In 1960, the National Assembly sent a letter to the Indian govern-
ment asking for Bhutan’s boundary with India to be regarded as an in-
ternational border and marked as such on official maps. ‘Bhutan’s king
also asserted that Bhutan is an independent and sovereign country and
that if it desires, it can have direct negotiations with China (ibid., 245).
Patterson (1962, 199) refers to Bhutan’s PM Jigme Dorji confirming
China’s approach to the Bhutanese ‘just over a year ago...with an offer
to negotiate a border agreement; also to recognise Bhutan’s sover-
eignty, to extend diplomatic recognition and to provide technical aid’.
During the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Bhutanese Prime Minister
Jigme Dorji protested Indian soldiers straying into Bhutan. When
Indira Gandhi was in the opposition, in a speech in October 1979, she
rhetorically asked the Indian audience, ‘Can you believe that a great
country like India has to take it lying down from a tiny country like
Bhutan?’ (247, see also Ram 1980, 32–34).
Back then, like now, the Indian and Bhutanese perception of the
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content, and significance.21 An important threat for Bhutan lies in the
forests of its southern border with India where various Indian insur-
gent militant groups operate (United Liberation Front of Assam,
ULFA; National Democratic Front of Bodoland, NDFB; Kamtapur
Liberation Army KLA).22 Another key threat for Bhutan comprises of
the precarity of its economic relationship with India, which makes it
possible for events in India to affect Bhutanese economy. This is true
at a regional border level where Indian labor unrest and militant oper-
ations can pose a threat to Bhutanese trade and commerce, but also
for larger economic events in India such as demonetization or rupee
crisis, because the chaos is transferred and amplified in Bhutan.
Bhutan has not taken sides on the India–China border dispute. The
fourth King (Jigme Singye Wangchuck) invited a Chinese representa-
tive to his coronation, and in his public statements expressed a desire
for friendly relations with China. China and Bhutan engagements have
proceeded since the coronation of the fourth King in 1974, with am-
bassadorial visits since 1994. Penjore (2004, 118) points out that
Bhutan has maintained a one-China policy by voting for restoring
China’s United Nations’ seat in 1971; Bhutan rejected Taiwan’s partici-
pation motions in UN and WHO (World Health Organization) as Vice
Chair at the 55th UN General Assembly and opposed Taiwan’s bid to
host 2002 Asian Games.
The developments in the 1950s in relation to Bhutan and China are
recounted in Penjore (2004), Kumar (2010), and Bisht (2012). In al-
most all these texts, Chinese policy is described as ‘carrots and sticks’,
the carrots being assurance of independence and economic assistance,
and the sticks being border claims or encroachments. Following a bor-
der incursion by China in September 1979, Bhutan and China border
talks commenced in 1984 (the preliminary talks began in 1981) and a
peace agreement was signed between the two sides in 1998 (after
21 A snapshot of Bhutan’s ‘buffer status’ in late 1950s is provided in Levi (1959). Mathou
(2000, 2005) provides periodic overviews of regional dynamics concerning the Sino-Indian
relations in relation to Bhutan and the Himalayas.
22 Ahsan and Chakma (1993, 1049–1054) detail the activities of the Nepali militants orga-
nized into entities with complex ideological and strategic incentives, that were a significant
threat to Bhutan and had bases in Indian territory. It is also worth noting that while the
use of Bhutanese territory by Indian insurgents received much attention in the 1990s, the
use of Indian territory by such groups, as well as the nature of passage for Lhotsampas
from Bhutan to Nepal via India, received considerably less attention.






/irap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/irap/lcab010/6327065 by guest on 24 July 2021
Chinese activities in the disputed areas in 1996) that contained a
Chinese acknowledgement of Bhutanese sovereignty with the text that
‘China fully respects the territorial integrity and independence of
Bhutan’. There was also an agreement to maintain peace and tranquil-
ity in the border areas, and pending final settlement, to maintain a
status-quo on the boundary as before March 1959.
All commentators note that China prefers a ‘package deal’ rather
than a ‘sector-by-sector’ settlement. In the 1990s, China offered to ex-
change 495 square kilometers area with an area of 269 square kilo-
meters in north-west Bhutan.23 However, the north western area
(Doklam/Gipmochi/Gyemochen) is perceived to be strategically rele-
vant for India, and this is the crux of the Doklam situation as it has
unfolded in recent years. Menon and Kanisetti (2018, italics original)
write, ‘Yet the Indo-Bhutan friendship cannot, indeed must not, be
taken for granted . . . Bhutan’s own silence on China’s occupation of
Doklam can be explained by the fact that it has perceived Doklam as
not being of vital interest to itself. . .Bhutan appears to now be striking
out and dealing with China on its own’. The trust deficit can be glar-
ing on such occasions, when there are fuming reports in the Indian me-
dia about any possible overtures or contacts between Bhutan and
China, which serve a useful purpose for domestic political mobilization
in India and further entrench strategies concerning China (cf.
Christensen, 1996).
As a small state, the use of ‘friendship’ discourse does stabilize and
address the security dilemma, but equally, it requires on the part of
Bhutan, a kind of diplomacy such as over the Doklam conflict, that
merits more attention. The discourse of friendship has been useful for
India in its own security calculations where Bhutan is often taken for
granted as the net provider of border security; for Bhutan a demon-
stration of this was the 2003 military operation conducted by Bhutan
to eliminate anti-Indian insurgents from its own southern territories.
This was led at the highest level of the state (King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck led the Royal Bhutan Army initiative to banish anti-Indian
guerillas from Bhutan). However, when India’s attempt to influence the
23 Referring to the series of meetings on border demarcation between Bhutan and China,
Bray (1993, 214) mentioned ‘in recent years the potential threat from the north appears to
have diminished. . . The two sides find it convenient to meet regularly without going so far
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2013 elections in Bhutan by signaling the withdrawal of fuel subsidy
was reported,24 it was again the longstanding understanding of friend-
ship specifically that both caused alarm in Bhutan and allowed for the
relations to be smoothed over eventually.25
The central dynamic that has lingered since the days of the great
game imperial rivalries, is the question of China’s intentions (and per-
ceptions of them) by India. The growing economic relationship be-
tween India and China has continued in parallel with an Indian con-
sensus (evident in policy and popular discourse) about the
undesirability of Bhutan’s own diplomatic relations with China.
Because the Bhutan–China dynamic continues to be a significant issue
in the way in which trust and friendship is interpreted on the Indian
side in their bilateral relationship with Bhutan, there have been re-
peated instances whereby the unresolved India–China border dispute
has created an imbroglio for Bhutan. This was most evident during the
extended stand-off at Doklam in 2017, when Indian and Chinese forces
faced off each other at Bhutan’s trijunction point.
During the Doklam dispute, Bhutan made a strategic use of silence
to avert confrontation with either power, and as a result of its responsi-
ble stance, between them. A Bhutanese media commentator Lamsang
(2017a) provides an overview of the Doklam incident. According to the
press release of the RGoB (Royal Government of Bhutan) Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued on 29 June 2017, road construction by
the Chinese PLA from Dokala in the Doklam area toward the Bhutan
army camp in Zompelri on 16 June was a violation of the 1988 and
1998 written agreements between the two countries to maintain peace
and tranquility and the status quo pending a final settlement on the
boundary question. Bhutan’s Ambassador to India, Major General V.
Namgyel, had issued a formal démarche to the Chinese Embassy in
24 For details of these events sourced from media news reports, see Malik and Sheikh (2016).
25 The first democratically elected government – led by DPT (Druk Phuensum Tshogpa)
party – that came to power in 2008 under the leadership of Jigme Y. Thinley as PM lost
power in 2013 elections when the announcement of a subsidy withdrawal by India was
seen as a signal indicating a preference for rival PDP (People’s Democratic Party). This
was understood in the light of Indian displeasure over Bhutan’s potentially warmer rela-
tions with China, specifically a handshake between Bhutanese PM and Chinese Premier
on 21 June 2012 at the sidelines of the Rio summit of the UN Conference on Sustainable
Development. The 2018 elections, bringing a new party (Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa or
DNT) to power, witnessed no allegations or reports of interference.
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Delhi on 20 June asking the Chinese side to stop the road construc-
tion. The GoI (Government of India) Ministry of External Affairs
(MEA) issued a press release on 30 June referring to this and stating
that such construction would represent a significant change of status
quo with serious security implications for India. In the subsequent two
months, Indian and Chinese armies were locked in a tense standoff at
Bhutan’s border that made global headlines.
In the context of Sino-Indian rivalry presentation over the Doklam
issue, China has practical administrative control of the region. India
has not been able to demonstrate the credibility of support toward
Bhutan on Bhutan’s preferred choice of policy, which would enhance
its real and perceived security. Simply put, China controls and adminis-
ters the area, Bhutan has a historic claim on it, but China and Bhutan
cannot settle their differences without Indian agreement since the area
is viewed as strategic for Indian security. Bhutan’s border with India
was finally demarcated in 2006. Bhutan’s close links with India are
longstanding and open to economic coercion and diplomatic manipula-
tion, but while exacerbating an entrenched Indo-China rivalry at
Bhutan’s borders increases Bhutanese insecurity, it is also both directly
counterproductive for India per se, and indirectly counterproductive
for the perception of India in Bhutan.
Mitra and Thaliyakkattil (2018, 241–243) present the different nar-
ratives of the three states suggesting that the Indian version appears to
be ‘the least supported by concrete evidence’ since ‘the official Indian
version concedes the Chinese allegations that the Indian troops crossed
the delineated boundary agreed upon by the two countries’. During the
Doklam standoff, while India and China both impinged on the sover-
eignty of the small state, it is by no means obvious that the specific ter-
ritorial claim is especially close to Bhutan’s perception of its national
interest. Bhutanese public sentiment is not appreciative of continued
bracketing into a prolonged unresolved matter, the resolution of which
would promote regional stability.
To achieve peace through accommodation (Morgenthau, 1948) calls
for intelligent diplomacy; techniques of persuasion and negotiation
may be as effective as pressure. Sartori (2005) counters perspectives in
IR that superficially judge diplomacy to be important, but at the same
time view it as superfluous for powerful states and ineffective for
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one state in an attempt to convey information to another’, then as a
form of communication, even though it may technically be ‘cheap
talk’, it is nonetheless powerful and can be effective, both for weak
and strong states (ibid.: 3). When the standoff was resolved in 2017,
India and China were the main actors in focus, however as Lamsang
(2017b, emphases added) points out, it was Bhutanese diplomacy that
averted Sino-Indian war:
At the beginning of the standoff one assumption . . . was that of
Bhutan being almost an Indian ‘protectorate’ and that it would do
whatever India wanted. The assumption on the other side was that
Bhutan would be intimidated by China. . .By the end of the standoff
both assumptions were turned on its head by Bhutan with its public
statements, as well as behind the scenes diplomacy with both
countries, helping them to not only achieve the disengagement, but
also drawing red lines for both sides.
Bhutan made its stand clear to China but refused to send its soldiers to
join the Indian soldiers to face the Chinese army.26 Bhutan also chose to
neither confirm nor deny that it had invited Indian troops into Doklam;
a strategic decision with ‘face-saving’ implications for India as well as
China. The role of Chinese and Indian media (see Lamsang, 2017c;
Bhatia, 2018; Gupta, 2019) came to the fore during the standoff that
lasted two months. The Bhutanese public were vexed with this dangerous
brinkmanship at their border, pointing out that they too could resort to
hyper-nationalism in a pre-election year (Bhutan’s third general elections
were held in 2018), but they were choosing to adopt a stance that would
avert war (Lamsang, 2017c). At the disengagement, Bhutan’s MFA is-
sued a precise statement on 29 August stating ‘We hope this contributes
to the maintenance of peace and tranquility and status quo along bor-
ders of Bhutan, China and India in keeping with the existing agreements
between respective countries’ (MFA, 2017).
A narrative such as the one provided here is rare but it highlights the
often unremarked role of the small state in preserving regional peace.
26 During the 1962 Sino-Indian war as well, Bhutan had refused to let its territory be used
by Indian forces. Moreover, as Patterson (1962, 200) noted at the time, ‘In the jealous
guarding of its sovereignty, Bhutan even refuses to have retired Indian officers to help
train its troops, despite the threat from the north’.
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On the other hand, a large amount of literature focuses exclusively on
actions and perceptions of India and China, even in a dispute that di-
rectly involves Bhutan. For instance, Ahlawat and Hughes (2018) discuss
the India–China stand-off in Doklam by referring exclusively to the of-
fensive realism of China and defensive realism of India, making refer-
ence to Bhutan in one sole paragraph, where it is referred to as a protec-
torate; that article on Doklam stand-off makes 223 mentions of India,
155 of China, and 12 of Bhutan (almost all exclusively in one single par-
agraph). In November 2020, reports again surfaced about the Chinese
having built a village a few kilometers inside Bhutanese borders.
Bhutan’s ambassador to India denied these reports, but Indian media
and Indian commentators insisted that this had actually happened.
As a state with a status anxiety, key anchors that pin Bhutanese pol-
icymaking are as follows – sovereignty preservation, maintenance of
peace, pioneering environmentalism, increasing diversification, gradual
internationalization, fostering a harmonious political culture with in-
creasing recognition of a wider range of rights, promotion of self-
reliance across a range of sectors, and employment generating eco-
nomic growth. While India sees China as the biggest challenge in
Bhutan, for Bhutan, Indian influence and its implications for their se-
curity is no less a challenge. The rivalrous and open outrightly hostile
dynamic between India and China is the biggest security threat to
Bhutan, and therefore Bhutanese foreign policy and diplomacy has
consistently sought to placate India with assurances of its friendship
and take the fallout of Indian trust deficit with a strategic silence.
Bhutan’s relationship with China is not hostile but amicable and it is
rooted in the understanding of its long term and multidimensional ori-
entation toward India. Bhutan’s main aim has been to keep its own
domestic politics coherent with its national interest and avoid the splin-
tering of its political sphere into pro-India and pro-China voices. A fi-
nal point needs mentioning here; as no theorist of international rela-
tions can fail to observe, sovereignty is a vexed concept.27 An idea of
27 There was a boundary realignment between Bhutan and China in 2007; Bhutan revised its
total area from 47000 sq kms to 38394 sq kms (see Phuntsho, 2013). This does not con-
form with observations drawn from post-Soviet landlocked states where ceding territory
in order to maintain cooperative relationships with transit states is an exceptional feature
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state sovereignty can be used to substantiate claims and counter claims
causing significant insecurity and continued hardship to those for
whom it is irrelevant; such sovereignty is almost irrelevant in terms of
lived experience for human communities in the sparsely populated high
altitude mountainous terrain, such as that at the Sino-Bhutan border.
4 Bhutanese international relations
As a small state in the vicinity of two rising powers, Bhutan is geopo-
litically strategic. The two powers – India and China – have opposing
self-ascribed identities as democratic and communist, so that their
power competition draws in a wide range of other neighboring coun-
tries, and is also of significant interest to important global (Euro-
American/Western) actors. The antagonistic relationship between India
and China is marked by a high mutual threat perception, frequent hos-
tilities along the range of their long-shared border across the
Himalayas and a demonstrable ineffectiveness of big power diplomacy
in bringing about conciliatory understandings in spite of increasing
volumes of trade between them.
This last section of the article makes an intervention into the IR
and small states literature by foregrounding the Bhutanese aspects of
this small state’s foreign policy. In other words, it suggests that
Bhutan’s foreign policy trajectory is important in both descriptive and
analytical terms to better grasp the Indian and Chinese interests as
they are negotiated by the Bhutanese, as opposed to accounts where
Bhutan is constructed as a passive placeholder with hardly any atten-
tion to its indigenous initiative. Both international and domestic fac-
tors are interconnected in the intermestic explanation of Bhutan’s for-
eign policy trajectory.
Though never colonized, Bhutan has inherited a legacy of status
anxiety due to its treatment during the imperial British era and the
overwhelming asymmetry of size and resources in the postcolonial pe-
riod;28 the basis of this anxiety included both territorial claims and
also formal treaty provisions that were in force until the start of the
28 On power asymmetry as an explanans for the diversity of the foreign policy behaviour of
small states, see Long (2017a, b). In terms of that framework, I would argue that for
Bhutan, hydropower resources can be seen as the basis for a particular-intrinsic power. Its
multifaceted relationship with India over a long period of time can be seen as a source of
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21st-century. Therefore, Bhutan has keenly valued and asserted its sov-
ereignty at every possible juncture, being significantly assisted by the
foresight of its monarchic leadership with stable successions (four di-
rect ones in the century between 1907 and 2007) and the careful delib-
erations of its people’s representatives (first in the National Assembly
from 1950s onwards, and then through conventionally elected legisla-
tors after the monarch-led and widely resisted transition to democracy
from 2007 onwards, see Mathou, 1999; Sinpeng, 2007; Kaul, 2008a,b;
Gallenkamp, 2012; Kinga, 2020).
In the second half of the 20th century, as a result of the changing re-
gional environment (status of Tibet, Sino-Indian war, differences in
points of view between the domestic elite, status of Sikkim), perforce, a
modernizing Bhutan had to establish and increase close bilateral links
with its transit state India, with whom its economy has been integrated
over time; these were strengthened over time through the discourse of
enduring friendship. It chose to gradually internationalize in several
successive waves, and has sought to be a norm entrepreneur state
through its pioneering of Gross National Happiness (GNH) and its
leading by example on environmental conservation. Bhutan is stable
and resilient, militarily weak but diplomatically capable; it has not pro-
voked any enmity with India and treads a cautious path with opposing
issues that are central to China (Tibet, Taiwan). It has not followed an
entirely elite-serving multi-vector foreign policy,29 but enmeshed30
wherever possible including with other small states. This small and
strategic, democratizing, carbon negative, GNH-professing, Asian wel-
fare state has been so far unable to resolve its northern boundary with
China because a resolution acceptable to them both is not perceived by
Bhutan’s main economic partner India to be in its interests. However,
its use of careful diplomacy (such as illustrated in the Doklam
derivative power. And finally, its efforts to internationalise can be seen as an attempt to le-
verage collective power.
29 Originally named as such by Kazakhstan, versions of a multi-vector approach to foreign
policy are found in other Central Asian states to different degrees. Kurç (2018, 317) pro-
vides a summary, ‘multi-vector foreign policy is about developing relations that are based
on non-ideological and pragmatic foundations, which are shaped by the interplay of exter-
nal and domestic dynamics, to foster short- or long-term benefits’.
30 In her investigation of Southeast Asian regional security strategies, Goh (2007, 121) out-
lines the idea of an enmeshment as something on a spectrum between an engagement on
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incident) has contributed to averting full-blown war between the two
hegemons, and in this sense it continues to be a net regional stability
provider.
Those who have written about the international relations of Bhutan
until now have focused mainly on the following descriptive factors: eco-
nomic conditions, bilateral relationship with India, and the engage-
ments with or threats from China (for instance Ahsan and Chakma,
1993; Kumar, 2010; Bisht, 2012; Mitra and Thaliyakkattil, 2018).31
These are to be expected in terms of the structural factors seen as sa-
lient in neorealist IR. A departure from such conventional accounts is
found in a paper by a Bhutanese scholar Galay (2004) that explicitly
considers the international politics of Bhutan in relation to small state
behavior theories in international relations, and predictably, finds insuf-
ficient explanatory value in them. He makes two important observa-
tions: the importance of the multi-perspectival understanding of secu-
rity, and India’s dependence on Bhutan (ibid., 93–95).
The first underscores Keohane and Nye’s (1977) point about grow-
ing issue-interdependence so that security decisions are embedded with
economic and socio-cultural considerations. Beyond the constructivist
correctives to neorealism, I speculate that the framework of National
Role Conceptions or NRCs32 in foreign policy analysis (see Gigleux,
2016) can be useful to grasp the Bhutanese view of culture and envi-
ronment as security problems, to understand how the ideational factors
and self-understandings drive foreign policy behavior. The second point
that rather few scholars have ever emphasized is the way in which
India is dependent on Bhutan. While it is easy to see the dependence
of the small state upon its larger transit state, it is also vital to note
the ways in which the regional sub-state economies of Indian areas
bordering Bhutan depend on it for electricity, trade, and
employment.33
31 The ‘southern problem’ is factored into these discussions, and international links are
briefly raised but without drawing upon them in any analytical manner. Bhutan and
Bangladesh relations are rarely mentioned, except by Ahsan and Chakma (1993).
32 NRCs are ‘policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments,
rules and actions suitable to that state, and of the functions, if any, their state should per-
form on a continuing basis in the international system’ (Gigleux, 2016, 28).
33 A recent demonstration of this was when Bhutan prepared to supply oxygen to India dur-
ing the devastation of the Covid crisis in India in summer 2021. See Kuensel (2021).
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Bhutanese foreign policy provides a clear and sustained evidence of
using diplomatic ties in a diversified and sequential manner. In spite of
its first diplomatic ties with India in 1968, a careful look at the pattern
of its internationalization evinces a diversified portfolio in terms of
geographical spread, ideology, level of economic resources and size.
Now, I suggest two additional axes through which we might explain
the trajectory of Bhutan’s foreign policy – a different notion of dis-
tance (not simply in geographical terms) and a learning from experi-
ence. I explain each of these in turn.
First, it is important to disaggregate the ways in which we might un-
derstand distance as playing a role in international politics. Critical IR
requires a recognition of the ways in which geography is neither a
straightforward matter, nor is it destiny. The very choice of descriptors
influences the nature of representations and constructs potential fram-
ings. For instance, as Pain (1996) argues, the development discourse
frames Bhutan as ‘mountainous’ in ways that connote the negative
attributes of ‘isolated’ and ‘inaccessible’; by comparison, analogous
framing of the country in terms of its ‘smallness’ is conspicuously ab-
sent. While there is no empirical dispute about the fact that the coun-
try is both mountainous and small, the disproportionate emphasis on
it being mountainous, means a focus on the mountain specificities, de-
scribed in terms of inaccessibility, fragility, marginality, diversity or het-
erogeneity; none of these characteristics are problematic per se, and
many are useful attributes (for example, remoteness is a ‘positional
good’ monetized by Bhutan’s tourism policy, and diversity and vari-
ability of micro-habitats contributes to risk avoidance and pest and dis-
ease control at the farm level). The framing matters, so that mountains
do not constrain on development in any simplistic manner, and small-
ness can, in fact, be correlated positively with excellence in both scale
and attitudes (ibid.: 66-76).
As in the case of being ‘mountainous’ or ‘small’, the framing of dis-
tance, and the terms through which distance is understood in foreign
policy is important. There is, of course, a fairly straightforward under-
standing of distance in physical terms, but if we factor in the role of
representations and historicity in order to understand foreign policy as
the policy of ‘making foreign’, then we are required to comprehend the
productivity of practices through which relationality between entities
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political geography approach to theorize the multiple ways in which
‘diplomacy depends on distances’ (462). Aspects of foreign policy
are shaped by different notions of distance, each of which has its own
distinctive logic. He advocates paying attention to three kinds of dis-
tances – gravitational, topological, and attributional (ibid., 445–462).
Gravitational distance, like gravity, refers to power cores, composites
around which there are generally assumed to be ‘spheres of influence’
of political power. Topological distance concerns the configuration of
political spaces; countries that exist between two places, whatever the
actual distances that may separate them. Attributional distance refers
to inherent qualities, or similarities along regime characteristics, that
are shared by different countries.
The explanatory value in the multiple ideas of distance explained here
is relevant for Bhutan. While Bhutan’s relations with India very clearly
fall into the category of gravitational power-core, a look at the list of
countries that it has expanded relationships with over time indicates a
foreign policy overwhelmingly based on the idea of developing links and
bridges in terms of attributional distance, specifically along the lines of
similarity along one or more of the following attributes – smallness,
monarchy, Buddhist ethos, and commitment to environmental values.
I empirically demonstrate this below using data from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA), Royal Government of Bhutan (RGoB) website.
I anchor the phases of Bhutan’s internationalization as below:
As noted in the previous sections, Bhutan’s first step in internationaliza-
tion was the establishment of its diplomatic relationship with India
and Bangladesh until the 1970s. The second step was Bhutan’s interna-
tionalization during the 1980s and until 1992; the expansion of relations
included Kuwait, Nepal, Maldives, The Netherlands, European Union,
Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Finland, Sri Lanka,
South Korea, Pakistan, Austria, Thailand, Bahrain. The economic sys-
tem, ideology, party affiliation is not overwhelmingly relevant, but a
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combination of smallness and/or monarchy and/or Buddhism is present
(Kuwait, Nepal, Maldives, The Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland,
Japan, Sri Lanka, Austria, Thailand, Bahrain). Environmental values,
along with a mix of developmental partnerships in Bhutan, are visible in
cases such as Sweden, The Netherlands, European Union, Switzerland.
The relationship with South Korea in September 1987 and Pakistan in
December 1988 came into being after significant changes in those two
countries.34
From 1992 to 2002, there was a pause. Bhutan established no new
bilateral diplomatic relations, although it did join several multilateral
bodies relating not just to environment and transport, but also tele-
communications (this must be viewed from the perspective of Bhutan
being opened up to television and Internet in 1999). In the period pre-
ceding the transition to democracy in 2007–08, a third step toward in-
ternationalization was taken when three new bilateral diplomatic rela-
tions came into being during 2002–03, with Australia, Singapore,
Canada. Here, the economic factors appear preponderant. In fact, as
of 2020, the distance in terms of mental maps between Bhutan and
Australia continues to steadily reduce as a significant number of
Bhutanese (especially teachers and civil servants) now go overseas to
Australia for training and employment. As a result, the Bhutanese di-
aspora in Australia may become an important voice in Bhutan.35
The fourth step was taken after the transition to democracy in 2007,
and during the term of the first government (DPT) that lasted until
2013. During this period, Bhutan established bilateral diplomatic rela-
tions with a large number of countries. Starting in 2009, and until
March 2013, bilateral diplomatic relations were established with
Belgium, Brazil, Afghanistan, Spain, Cuba, Fiji, Morocco,
Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Serbia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Vietnam,
Myanmar, Argentina, Costa Rica, Andorra, Mauritius, Eswatini,
United Arab Emirates, Slovenia, Slovakia, Armenia, Turkey, Egypt,
34 The June democracy movement in South Korea and the end of General Zia’s dictatorship
in Pakistan with Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party winning the elections in
November 1988.
35 Here, I refer to the largely educated and better off diaspora group of emigrant Bhutanese
citizens that may have a voice in Bhutan’s politics. There is also the Bhutanese exile dias-
pora and resettled refugees in multiple countries who have advocacy/activist groups and
political organizations, however, this diaspora political experience (see Banki, 2013) is not
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Kazakhstan, Poland, Colombia, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Oman. During
this fourth step, the relations included countries in Africa and South
America; they exhibit no discernible ideological tilt (relations with
Turkey and Armenia were actually established on the same day in
September 2012). In this phase, there is no specific set of attributes re-
lating to monarchy, Buddhist ethos, or economic power-core. There is
the presence of rising powers like Brazil in 2009, or an expected turning
point in Afghanistan in 2010, and a clear resonance on environmental
commitments with a country like Costa Rica, but unlike the earlier
steps of internationalization, this fourth step of internationalization
exhibits no cluster of cases to indicate the bridging of gravitational or
attributional distance. It rather indicates Bhutan’s own efforts to place
its values on the global center stage to promote its idea of happiness;
norm entrepreneurship through niche diplomacy.36 The period from
2013 to November 2020 was again a pause (akin to 1992–2002) that
saw no new bilateral diplomatic relations; Bhutan also joined no new
multilateral bodies. This ‘pause’ covers the entire term of the second
elected government, where the party (PDP) came to power against a
background of rumored Indian interference in the elections.37
In November 2020, two years into the term of the third elected gov-
ernment (a new party, Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa, DNT) that began in
2018, diplomatic relations were established with Germany, clearly an
economic powerhouse and a center of gravity in Europe, especially at a
time when the United Kingdom is disentangling through Brexit.
Shortly afterwards, in December 2020, formal relations were estab-
lished with Israel. These changes are indicative of a fifth step in inter-
nationalization (likely similar to the third step where economic factors
36 On 1 October 2012, Bhutan’s then PM Thinley also participated in the inaugural Forum
of Small States (FOSS) Conference in New York. For a report of this conference, see UN
(2012). FOSS, with over a hundred states as members now, was initiated by Singapore in
1992 as ‘an informal and non-ideological grouping of small states. . .that meet a few times
a year to discuss issues of concern to small states’ (MFA, Singapore at https://www.mfa.
gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/International-Issues/Small-States, see also
Corbett, Xu and Weller, 2019, 666).
37 However, in this period too, several of Bhutan’s foreign relations were underscored with
high profile events. For instance, in 2016, Bhutan hosted royal visits from UK, Sweden,
Saudi Arabia, and also the ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to India (see
Kuensel, 2017).
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predominate). Bhutan does not have formal diplomatic relations with
the UK, USA, Russia, or China as of the time of this writing.
The first ‘pause’ in internationalization in the 1990s after what I
have termed as the ‘second step’, could be explained to an extent by
the fallout of the ‘Southern problem’, which led to multiple media
framings of Bhutan as a country that had expelled refugees and carried
out ethnic cleansing (see footnote 3 above). The period from 2003 to
2008 was marked by significant domestic legal, institutional, and orga-
nizational architecture that was put in place to transition to a democ-
racy. The second ‘pause’ after the ‘fourth step’ from 2013 onwards can
best be understood in terms of domestic factors, specifically the inter-
nal polarization that was created in Bhutan after the election campaign
of 2013. The incumbent DPT that lost the 2013 elections came to be
seen as the ‘morally injured’ party that had to pay a price for antago-
nizing India by asserting Bhutan’s international personality (as a prob-
able prelude to opening up relations with China, the latter being a
specter of intense fear in India) by its supporters, and as a party of
‘anti-nationals’ by its opponents, including the supporters of the win-
ning party PDP, because the DPT leadership was alleged to have been
present at an infamous post-election meeting where anti-monarchist
slogans were reportedly chanted (see Kinga, 2020). The veracity – for
or against – of these details is hard to prove, but the polarizing term
of the ‘anti-nationals’ echoed back to the same term (‘ngolop’ in na-
tional language Dzongkha) that was used for those opposed to the
government during the ‘southern problem’. There is no discernible
overlap between these real or imagined anti-nationals during the differ-
ent eras (the DPT being a staunchly traditional party that did not have
a particular power base in the south of the country), but the polariza-
tion affected the population to a significant extent, and thereby,
resulted in a domestic consensus about the undesirability of accelerated
internationalization. In contrast to many theoretical predictions that
domestic factors are salient only for larger states’ foreign policy, there
is an important role of the domestic factors on the direction of foreign
policy of this small state.
The overall idea of distance in all its multiple interpretations is helps
to understand the trajectory of Bhutan’s international relations and its
connexions to value domain, role conceptions, and domestic politics.
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with India – and even that the analysis is often exclusively from the
Indian point of view – its gravitational distance to India notwithstand-
ing, countries which may be seen as ‘close’ for Bhutan will include
Japan, Thailand, Switzerland, Kuwait – which are not ‘near’ in terms
of physical distance. Bhutanese diplomacy has facilitated this along
with managing its long-standing friendship with India.
Second, a more accurate understanding of Bhutan’s trajectory can
be had by paying attention to learning from experience. Nepal and
Bhutan are both landlocked small states in Asia, but their policies have
followed very different trajectories. The traditional explanation for this
is that Nepal has chosen balancing between India and China, whereas
Bhutan has chosen to bandwagon with India. However, as I have ar-
gued in this article, if we take a more careful look at Bhutan’s foreign
policy, it becomes apparent that there is no unambiguous way of sup-
porting the assertion of bandwagoning, and multiple initiatives under-
taken by Bhutan reveal its independence in foreign policy and the role
of its careful diplomacy. As a small state with a distinctive trajectory
of incrementalist and cautious internationalization, supported by an
extraordinarily stable set of domestic institutions with gradual decen-
tralization of power, Bhutan has benefited from the examples of other
countries in the region that existed in the past, came into being later,
or survive into the present (viz., Sikkim, Nepal, Tibet, Bangladesh).
The experiences of each of these entities played an important role in
the learning that was incorporated into the thinking behind Bhutanese
foreign policy and its instruments of diplomacy. For instance, Chinese
control over Tibet from 1951 and the Sino-Indian war in 1962, precipi-
tated accelerating modernization in Bhutan through its decision to en-
act developmental planning. The mingling of religion and politics in
the fate of Tibet is in sharp contrast to the clearly delineated demarca-
tion between religious and secular realms in Bhutan; so much so that
even after the transition to democracy in 2007, the clergy do not have
a vote in Bhutan. The Indian takeover of Sikkim in 1975 was another
important lesson for Bhutan, preceded as it was by demographic and
cultural transformation of the Himalayan state. When Bangladesh was
established as the new sovereign country in 1971, Bhutan was the first
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country in the world to recognize it;38 the diplomatic relations between
Bhutan and Bangladesh were established in 1973, and have continued
to be strong since (Kaul and Khandu, 2020). Unlike the bloodshed
and intrigue (the palace massacre in 2001) that eventually resulted in
the demise of the over two centuries old monarchy in Nepal in 2008,
Bhutanese monarchy consolidated its credibility over the same period
by growing its international reputation by devolving power.39 Indeed,
Bhutan’s Kings have personally played an important role in creating
diplomatic space for Bhutan in South Asia and beyond through a
range of symbolic, commemorative, and sympathetic gestures over
time.40
Even at a crucial turning point such as the aftermath of the 1962 war
between India and China, when it might have been tempting to emulate
the Nepalese strategy of balancing between India and China, Bhutan
rejected the Nepalese model as inappropriate, and opted to gradually ex-
pand its relations with the outside world without undermining the re-
gional and security interests of its friend India by using a different ap-
proach to achieve what Rose (1974, 199) called ‘equally positive, if less
dramatic results’; nearly half a century ago, writing in the context of
Bhutan’s China policy, he observed: ‘To the Royal Government, Nepal
is as much an example of how not to manage a country’s external rela-
tions as it is an object for emulation’ (ibid., 205). Furthermore, ‘observ-
ing Nepal’s relationship with India, which included blockades in 1960,
1969, 1989-1990, and 2015-2016, the Bhutanese judged that by antago-
nizing India and playing the China card, Nepal managed only to
38 This is in contrast to Kinne (2014, 251–252) whereby unilateral moves that resist transitive
influences (for instance, a country formally recognising the independence of others) are
understood as being “largely a luxury of the powerful”.
39 It is important to note that unlike many other countries, Bhutan’s monarchy is not divine
right nor rooted in religious inheritance; it was instituted in 1907, with a measure of popu-
lar support. Reforms carried out by the third King had included the ability of the
National Assembly to register a vote of no-confidence in the King, and Bhutan’s current
Constitution, initiated by the fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuck at the time of his vol-
untary abdication in favour of his son (the fifth King Jigme Khesar Namgyel
Wangchuck), contains provisions that requires monarchs to retire at the age of 65 years
(on various aspects over time, see Rose, 1977; Mathou, 1999, 624–626; Iyer, 2019; Kaul,
2008a, 2021a).
40 These gestures have ranged, for instance, from the fifth King (and Queen Jetsun Pema) at-
tending the state funeral of Singapore’s founding PM Lee Kuan Yew in 2015 (and flying
Bhutan’s flags at half-mast as gesture toward the ASEAN country) to holding a prayer
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destabilise the country’s internal politics and retard its economic devel-
opment’ (Mitra and Thaliyakkattil, 2018, 256).
Traditionally, the bilateral relationship with India is the mainstay of
Bhutan’s foreign policy, around which a growing internationalization in
discrete waves over successive decades, has built an additional layer of
security through a constrained enmeshment. The axis of Bhutan’s link-
age with India is a positive line back to long-term friendship diplomacy
and cooperation; this dynamic is offset against India’s ‘fear/threat of
China’. Bhutan’s linkage with other global actors is its positive na-
tional role conception via pursuit of GNH and environmental values;
this is offset against the legacy of the ‘southern problem’. As of 2020,
the positive links to India and other global actors are durable for
Bhutan, the southern problem of ethnic violence flare up in late 1980s
and early 1990s has been effectively addressed with the combination of
third country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees from the camps in
Nepal, and the rehabilitation into citizenship through the granting of
‘citizenship kidus’ (welfare grants of citizenship by the current fifth
King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck) for over 10,000 southern
Bhutanese people in Bhutan who were directly or indirectly affected by
the civil strife and state securitization.41 In addition, the transition to
parliamentary democracy and the consolidation of its democratic tra-
jectory and institutions ensures domestic stability within the country.
5 Conclusion
Nuanced studies of the political dynamics of the Himalayan region are
imperative to challenge the simplistic pictures of great power agency
and strategy, which can benefit from novel insights into the role of
small states, beyond the ideas of buffers. This article provides an origi-
nal account to show precisely how Bhutan – as a peaceful sovereign
small Himalayan state, a consolidating democracy,42 and a norm
41 Shaw (2015: 17) provides an account of the political role of Kidu and refers to the grant of
8,374 citizenships in 2014. These citizenships ceremonies are held for a few hundred peo-
ple at a time. Kuensel (2019) reports the ceremony granting citizenship to 356 people in
March 2019, by which time 10,200 citizenships had been granted.
42 I use consolidation here in the classical sense of Schedler (1998, 104–105) about avoiding
democratic erosion and expectations of regime continuity, but also to indicate a demo-
cratic deepening, whereby: ‘It [democracy] is a moving target, an open-ended, develop-
mental kind of thing—and so is democratic deepening’.
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entrepreneur in the area of environmental conservation – has used a di-
versity of strategies in its domestic and foreign policy to ensure the sur-
vival and well-being of its people, and the sustained pursuit of its na-
tional interest, especially when it comes to a direct trajectory of
sovereignty preservation and enhancement. It further shows how the
trajectory of Bhutanese international relations is vital beyond the trope
of India as the only friend and China as the only threat.43 Though the
main threat to the Himalayan region in contemporary times is posed
by India–China hostility and the Doklam incident very nearly escalated
into a war, Bhutan’s careful diplomatic navigation of the standoff was
a crucial contribution to averting it, thereby illustrating that small
states can play a role in war not being a fait accompli on a volatile
frontier. Overlaying an understanding of Bhutanese foreign policy
within contemporary IR literature, this article encourages additional
work on the role of small states in the larger political dynamics in
Asia. In doing so, it further advances the claim that the political dy-
namics of individual polities fundamentally matter in our ability to ho-
listically conceptualise the variegated workings of power.
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to answer it responded with the two words ‘climate change’. In 2017, a former US ambas-
sador to the Asian Development Bank noted, ‘Large countries will seek in the years ahead
to apply economic or military pressure to shape their smaller neighbors’ behaviors and
policies – no different than today. Asia and the Pacific, however, will be better off if all
nations adopt some modern-day, “small state ideas” offered up by Bhutan, Timor-Leste
and Singapore – namely the embrace of a greener, more representative and more transpar-







/irap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/irap/lcab010/6327065 by guest on 24 July 2021
References
Ahlawat, D. and Hughes, L. (2018) ‘India-China stand-off in Doklam: align-
ing realism with national characteristics’, The Round Table 107(5), 613–625.
Ahsan, S. Aziz-al and Chakma, B. (1993) ‘Bhutan’s foreign policy: cautious
self-assertion?’, Asian Survey 33(11), 1043–1054.
Amstrup, N. (1976) ‘The perennial problem of small states: a survey of re-
search efforts’, Cooperation and Conflict 11(3), 163–182.
Avtar, R. (1986) ‘Bhutan – a geopolitical survey’, in G. Sharma and K. S.
Nagar (eds), India’s Northern Security, pp. 193–200. New Delhi: Reliance
Publishing House.
Baehr, P. R. (1975) ‘Small states: a tool for analysis, Review Article’, World
Politics 27(3), 456–466.
Bailes, A.J.K., Thayer, B.A. and Thorhallsson, B. (2016) ‘Alliance theory and
alliance ‘Shelter’: the complexities of small state alliance behaviour’, Third
World Thematics 1(1), 9–26.
Baldacchino, G. (2018) ‘Editorial: mainstreaming the study of small states and
territories’, Small States & Territories 1(1), 3–16.
Banki, S. (2013) ‘The transformation of homeland politics in the area of reset-
tlement: Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and the diaspora’, in M. Hutt (ed.),
European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 43, 120–143. Kathmandu: EBHR.
Bhatia, A. (2018) ‘Media representation of the Doklam stand-off between
India and China’, April 26. http://akratibhatia.com/wp-content/uploads/
2020/06/India-China-Thesis_akrati-bhatia.pdf
Bhatnagar, S. and Ahmed, Z.S. (2020) ‘Geopolitics of landlocked states in
South Asia: a comparative analysis of Afghanistan and Nepal’, Australian
Journal of International Affairs 1–20.
Bisht, M. (2010) ‘India-Bhutan relations: from developmental cooperation to
strategic partnership’, Strategic Analysis 34(3), 350–353.
Bisht, M. (2012). ‘Bhutan’s foreign policy determinants: an assessment’,
Strategic Analysis 36(1), 57–72.
Bray, J. (1993) ‘Bhutan: the dilemmas of a small state’, World Today 49, 213–216.
Chin, C.S. (2017) ‘Small nations, big lessons’, Kuensel Newspaper October 23.
Christensen, T.J. (1996) Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Cooper, A.F. and Shaw, T.M. (2009) The Diplomacies of Small States Between
Vulnerability and Resilience, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Corbett, J., Veenendaal, W. and Ugyel, L. (2017) ‘Why monarchy persists in
small states: the cases of Tonga, Bhutan and Liechtenstein’,
Democratization 24(4), 689–706.






/irap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/irap/lcab010/6327065 by guest on 24 July 2021
Corbett, J., Xu, Y.C. and Weller, P. (2019) ‘Norm entrepreneurship and diffu-
sion “from below” in international organisations: How the competent per-
formance of vulnerability generates benefits for small states’, Review of
International Studies 45(4), 647–668.
Crowards, T. (2002) ‘Defining the category of ‘small’ states’, Journal of
International Development 14(2), 143–179.
Datta-Ray, S.K. (1984) Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim. Delhi: Vikas
Publishing.
Devere, H. and Smith, G. (2010) ‘Friendship and politics’, Political Studies
Review 8, 341–356.
Devere, H., Mark, S. and Verbitsky, J. (2011). ‘The language of friendship in
international treaties’, International Politics 48(1), 46–70.
Dorji, T. (2018) ‘Bhutan proposes to graduate from LDC in 2023’, Kuensel
Newspaper June 2.
Doty, R.L. (1997) Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representations in
North-South Relations, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dutt, S. (1981) ‘Scholarship on Bhutan’, China Report 17(5), 58–62.
Elman, M.F. (1995) ‘The foreign policies of small states: challenging neoreal-
ism in its own backyard’, British Journal of Political Science 25(2), 171–217.
Galay, K. (2004) ‘International politics of Bhutan’, Journal of Bhutan Studies
10, 90–108.
Gallenkamp, M. (2012) ‘When agency triumphs over structure: conceptualiz-
ing Bhutan’s unique transition to democracy, Heidelberg papers in South
Asian and comparative politics’, Working Paper 68, https://crossasia-jour
nals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/hdpapers/article/view/2236
Gigleux, V. (2016) ‘Explaining the diversity of small states’ foreign policies
through role theory’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1(1), 27–45.
Goh, E. (2007) ‘Great power and hierarchy order in Southeast Asia: analyzing
regional security strategies’, International Security 32(3), 113–157.
Gupta, S. (2019) ‘The Doklam standoff revisited: a content examination of
Sino-Indian media’, International Journal of Recent Technology and
Engineering 8(2), 4103–4113.
Gvalia, G., Siroky D., Lebanidze B., Iashvili Z. (2013) ‘Thinking outside the
bloc: explaining the foreign policies of small states’, Security Studies 22(1),
98–131.
Henrikson, A.K. (2002) ‘Distance and foreign policy: a political geography ap-
proach’, International Political Science Review 23(4), 437–466.
Hey, J.A.K. (2003) Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy
Behavior London: Lynne Riener.
Hutchison, E. and Bleiker, R. (2014) ‘Introduction: emotions and world poli-







/irap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/irap/lcab010/6327065 by guest on 24 July 2021
Hutt, M. (2003) Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of
Refugees from Bhutan, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hutt, M. (ed.) (2013) The Bhutanese Refugee Resettlement Experience.
European Bulletin of Himalayan Research, 43. Kathmandu: EBHR.
Idan, A. and Shaffer B. (2011) ‘The foreign policies of post-soviet landlocked
states’, Post-Soviet Affairs 27(3), 241–268.
Iyer, V. (2019) ‘Constitution-making in Bhutan: a complex and sui generis ex-
perience’, The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 7(2), 359–385.
Jackson, V. (2014) ‘Power, trust, and network complexity: three logics of hedg-
ing in Asian security’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14(3),
331–356.
Jesse, N.G. and Dreyer, J.R. (2016) Small States in the International System:
At Peace and at War. London: Lexington Books.
Joseph, C.M. (2012) ‘China–South Asia strategic engagements: Bhutan–China
Relations, institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) Working Paper, National
University of Singapore’, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/157-china-
south-asia-strategic-engagements-2-bhutan-china-relations/
Kaul, N. (2008a) ‘Power to the people’, Centre for the Study of Democracy
Bulletin 15(2), 1–2, 20.
Kaul, N. (2008b) ‘Bearing better witness in Bhutan’, Economic and Political
Weekly 43(37), 67–69.
Kaul, N. (2021a) ‘“Where Is Bhutan?” The Production of Bhutan’s
Asymmetrical Inbetweenness in Geopolitics’, The Journal of Asian Studies
80(2), 317–336. doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911820003691.
Kaul, N. (2021b) ‘Representing Bhutan: a critical analysis of the politics of
knowledge production’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
1–29. doi: 10.1080/03086534.2021.1883245.
Kaul, N. (2021c) ’Small state, big example: Covid pandemic management in
Bhutan’, Critical Studies on Security 9(1), 58–62. doi: 10.1080/
21624887.2021.1904359.
Kaul., N and Khandu, S. (2020) ‘Small state relations: Bhutan and
Bangladesh’, Asia Dialogue March 30. https://theasiadialogue.com/2020/03/
30/small-state-relations-bhutan-and-bangladesh/
Keohane, R.O. (1969) ‘Lilliputians’ dilemmas: small states in international pol-
itics’, International Organization 23(2), 291–310.
Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics
in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Kharat, R.S. (2005) Foreign Policy of Bhutan. New Delhi: Manak
Publications.
Kinga, S. (2020) Democratic Transition in Bhutan: Political Contests as Moral
Battles. Abingdon: Routledge.






/irap/advance-article/doi/10.1093/irap/lcab010/6327065 by guest on 24 July 2021
Kinne, B.J. (2014) ‘Dependent diplomacy: signaling, strategy, and prestige in
the diplomatic network’, International Studies Quarterly 58, 247–259.
Kuensel. (2015) ‘His Majesty attends funeral service of Lee Kuan Yew’,
Kuensel Newspaper March 30.
Kuensel. (2017) ‘High profile visits bolsters foreign relations’, Kuensel
Newspaper February 25.
Kuensel. (2019) ‘HM grants citizenship to 359 people’, Kuensel Newspaper
March 14.
Kuensel. (2020) ‘Prayer ceremony for Late President Pranab Mukherjee held’,
Kuensel Newspaper September 2.
Kuensel. (2021) ‘Bhutan prepares to supply oxygen to India’, Kuensel
Newspaper April 27.
Kumar, P. (2010) ‘Sino-Bhutanese relations: under the shadow of
India–Bhutan friendship’, China Report 46(3), 243–252.
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